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a process evaluation in Mozambique
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Abstract
Background: Performance-based financing (PBF) reforms aim to directly influence health worker behavior through
changes to institutional arrangements, accountability structures, and financial incentives based on performance.
While there is still some debate about whether PBF influences extrinsic or intrinsic motivators, recent research finds
that PBF affects both. Against this backdrop, our study presents findings from a process evaluation of a PBF
program in Mozambique, exploring the perceived changes to both internal and external drivers of health worker
motivation associated with PBF.
Methods: We used a qualitative research design with in-depth, semi-structured interviews with health workers,
which included a rank order exercise and focus group discussions. Interviews were analyzed by two researchers
using thematic analysis techniques. Rank order frequency was calculated using weighted average methodology.
Results: Health workers reported that PBF, overall, positively influenced their motivation by introducing or
reinforcing both internal and external motivational drivers. Internal drivers included enhanced self-efficacy driven by
goal orientation, healthy competition among colleagues, and job satisfaction. External drivers included an organized
work environment, enhanced access to equipment and supplies, financial incentives, teamwork, and regular
consultations with verifiers (a type of supervision). PBF stimulates an interactive relationship between internal and
external motivational drivers, creating a feedback loop involving responsibility, achievement, and recognition, which
increased perceived motivation.
Conclusions: The PBF program helped workers feel that they had well-defined and achievable goals and that they
received recognition from verification teams, management committees, and colleagues due to enhanced
accountability and governance. Our paper shows that financial incentives could serve as the “driver” to kick-start the
feedback loop, of responsibility, achievement, and recognition, in environments that lack other drivers.
Understanding how PBF programs can be designed and refined to reinforce this feedback loop could be a
powerful tool to further enhance and track positive motivational changes. For countries thinking about PBF, we
recommend that policymakers assess the loop in their contexts, identify drivers, determine whether these drivers
are sufficient, and consider PBF if they are not.
Trial registration: We obtained ethical approval for the study protocol, data collection instruments, and informed
consent forms from the Ethics Review Committee of the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) [IRB
2015–190] and the Ethics Review Committee of the Mozambique Ministry of Health.
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Background
Health systems in low- and middle-income countries
(LMICs) are plagued by several challenges, including
weak management structures, inefficient information
systems, and poor accountability for performance [1].
Health sector performance is critically dependent on
health worker performance because service quality, as
well as the accessibility and efficiency of health service
delivery, is directly mediated by workers’ ability and will-
ingness to apply themselves to their tasks [2]. Resource
availability and worker competence are essential but not
sufficient to ensure desired worker performance [3].
Hence, motivation—which we define as an individual’s
degree of willingness to exert and maintain effort toward
organizational goals [2]—is critical for ensuring that
qualified workers perform well. Against this backdrop,
performance-based financing (PBF) has emerged as a
promising intervention for improving the delivery of
high-quality healthcare services by enhancing health
worker motivation.
A handful of studies have investigated whether PBF does
indeed enhance health worker motivation, with mixed re-
sults. In Nigeria [4], Burundi [5], Tanzania [6, 7], and Si-
erra Leone [8], PBF had an overall positive effect on
motivation, whereas in Benin [9], DRC [10], Pakistan [11],
and Zambia [12], PBF did not appear to change levels of
health worker motivation. In Afghanistan, PBF was nega-
tively associated with motivational factors, although it had
a significant positive effect on quality of care [13].
Motivation is often conceptualized using an intrinsic-
extrinsic dichotomy, where behavior is categorized as ex-
trinsically or intrinsically motivated based on whether or
not it was induced by some external stimulus [14, 15].
PBF as an intervention—particularly the individual
financial incentives, which are part of most PBF
schemes—is believed to primarily enhance extrinsic
motivation. However, elements of PBF may foster
both extrinsic and intrinsic motivation. Evidence on
the motivational mechanisms of PBF remains scarce,
but some studies have found that PBF can stimulate
intrinsic forms of motivation, such as transforming
the work environment [4, 9, 12, 16, 17], giving
health workers opportunities to improve skills, en-
hancing recognition from the community [4, 19],
and strengthening professional pride and responsibil-
ity [9, 19]. It thus appears that PBF as a complex
systems intervention has the potential to influence
many different types of motivational determinants
[20–22].
This study explores the different ways PBF influences
health worker motivation in the context of a PBF pilot
in Mozambique. Our objective is to assess the perceived
changes, by health workers, on motivational drivers as-
sociated with the introduction of PBF.
Study setting
The CDC PEPFAR program in Mozambique financed the
implementation of a PBF program targeting government-
owned health facilities in two provinces of Mozambique
(Gaza and Nampula) in early 2011. By 2015, the PBF pro-
gram included 138 health facilities (73 facilities in Gaza
and 65 facilities in Nampula), but was ended in 2016 and
never scaled past these two provinces.
The program focuses on providing HIV-related services,
primarily for pregnant women and children. Twenty-one
incentivized indicators are clustered in four groups by the
type of service: prevention of mother-to-child transmis-
sion (PMTCT), pediatric HIV, adult HIV/TB, and mater-
nal and child health (MCH). Payment is based on the sum
of three components: quantity, quality, and equity (for
rural and hard-to-reach areas). Health facilities report on
PBF indicators monthly and submit aggregated reports on
a quarterly basis. Data verification and payment cycles
occur every quarter and are conducted jointly by the
implementing NGO and the Provincial Health Office
(DPS). PBF earnings are re-invested in the facility (40%)
and used to provide salary top-ups to staff (60%). Salary
top-ups are distributed among all health facility staff based
on such pre-determined criteria as years of experience, fa-
cility tenure, level of education, and professional position.
According to internal program data, salary top-ups ac-
count for between 20 and 50% of an average health
worker’s salary, and facility investments for approximately
50% of total facility operating costs.
Methods
Data collection and analysis
To understand perceptions of health worker motivation,
we used a qualitative research design with in-depth, semi-
structured interviews, including a rank order exercise and
focus group discussions. Our sample included 56 health
workers and administrators (Table 1). Motivational deter-
minants were identified through a free-listing exercise
where health workers were first asked to define motivation
and then asked to write a list of all the determinants or
drivers of motivation associated with their jobs in June
2015. They were then asked to describe changes they
observed within the health facility since the introduction
of PBF and to reflect on the positive, negative, or null
changes related to PBF across 15 motivational determi-
nants (Table 2).
During in-depth interviews and focus groups,
clinic-focused health workers completed an exercise with
the 15 determinants, ranking them from the most to
least, or not at all, influenced by PBF. Data were col-
lected, between November and December 2015, at 17
public (government-owned and government-operated)
health facilities in Nampula (nine) and Gaza (eight), 76%
of them primary health centers and 71% classified as
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rural or peri-urban. We selected a range of facilities
based on size, geographic location (rural, peri-urban,
urban), and facility performance data. Each facility had
participated in the PBF program for a minimum of
18 months.
All interviews were conducted by two researchers and
transcribed in Portuguese, then imported into ATLAS.ti
version 1.0.14 for thematic analysis. Two or three re-
searchers conducted focus group discussions in three
urban (two Gaza, one Nampula) and three rural (one
Gaza, two Nampula) health facilities. Two researchers
coded interviews line-by-line and analyzed them to iden-
tify recurring themes and variations across responses.
Initial themes and sub-codes were organized based on
the theoretical model of intrinsic and extrinsic dichot-
omy, although interactions and relationships between
domains were further noted through memos and subse-
quent coding. Differences among health worker cadres,
provinces, and health facility level were all assessed
based on coding patterns and quotations for each di-
mension. Rank order frequency was calculated using
weighted average methodology for determinants most
influenced by PBF.
Results
Health workers reported that PBF had influenced motiv-
ation in direct and indirect ways, with 11 motivational
determinants ranked as influenced by PBF (Table 2).
Four determinants were grouped together during the
analytical process due to similarity in description and
conceptualization by informants (see notes below table).
Four determinants were identified as not influenced by
PBF. There were no notable differences between the re-
sponses or rankings in the two different provinces.
Table 3 contains illustrative quotations (annex).
Key motivational determinants
More organized work environment
Health workers described PBF as a tool for creating a
more organized work environment. Medical and office
supplies required for day-to-day work were more readily
available, enhancing efficiency and comfort. Workers felt
Table 1 Profile of study participants (worker motivation)
Gaza Nampula Total
N (% of province) N (% of province) N (% of total)
Total participants
In-depth interviews 16 (84%) 17 (85%) 33 (85%)
Focus group discussions 3 FGDs (16%) with an avg. of 4.6
participants
3 FGDs (15%) with an avg. of 3.3
participants
6 (15%) with a total of 24
participants
Total 19 (100%) 20 (100%) 39 (100%)
Sex, no. (%)
Male 8 (47%) 6 (35%) 14 (41%)
Female 9 (53%) 11 (65%) 20 (59%)
Total 17 (100%) 17 (100%) 34 (100%)
Professional position, no. (%)
Nurse (chief/head) 0 (0%) 2 (12%) 2 (6%)
Nurse (general) 1 (6%) 1 (6%) 2 (3%)
Nurse (MNCH) 5 (29%) 6 (35%) 11 (32%)
Medical technician (general) 7 (41%) 8 (47%) 15 (44%)
Counselor 2 (12%) 0 (%) 2 (6%)
Facility administrator/
manager
2 (12%) 0 (%) 2 (6%)
Total 17 (100%) 17 (100%) 34 (100%)
PBF exposure (avg. no. of
quarters)
9.3 Q (2.3 years) 11.7 Q (2.92 years) 10.6 Q (2.65 years)
Number of health facilities 8 9 17
Facility level, no. (%)
Tertiary 2 (25%) 2 (22%) 4 (25%)
Primary 6 (75%) 7 (78%) 13 (75%)
Total 8 (100%) 9 (100%) 17 (100%)
Q quarter (equivalent of 3 months)
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that PBF had changed their typical workflow, by organiz-
ing the environment and patient books, increasing coord-
ination of which patients they should see or follow up.
There were several notable structural changes that
health workers reported. The physical appearance of
the facilities, including wall painting, infrastructure up-
grades (e.g., latrines and septic tanks), and cleanliness
(less trash, more waste bins available, clean consult-
ation rooms), was most frequently reported. For health
facilities with “deteriorating infrastructure and inad-
equate equipment and supplies,” PBF transformed the
facility with “newly painted walls with functional win-
dows and doors and general cleanliness.” These struc-
tural improvements influenced workers’ pride in and
satisfaction with the appearance of their facilities.
Respondents further described how PBF introduced
specific, timely, and frequent verification processes,
whereby provincial project staff and DPS would visit
each facility on a consistent and planned basis, and ver-
ify the reported data through register checks. Facilities
reacted by instituting daily and weekly record-keeping
and self-verification to ensure the completeness and
quality of the data. Management committee meetings
were conducted monthly to plan and discuss PBF.
Ability to perform well
Health workers reported being more committed to their
work, giving up other personal and professional duties to
ensure they completed tasks and increased the success of
PBF in their facilities. Doing a “good job” was perceived as
following instructions, completing the registry, and com-
municating with team members. They also linked doing a
good job to adherence to clinical protocols; while health
workers reported having access to and understanding cor-
rect clinical protocols even before PBF, the scheme in-
creased attention to the protocols as well as accountability
for adherence. In general, all respondents suggested that
their colleagues were as committed to and proud of the
work as they were themselves.
Bonus or salary top-up
Although respondents did not rank performance bonuses
as the most significant aspect of PBF that enhanced their
motivation, every health worker interviewed described the
effects of incentives in their work. The financial bonus
made the health workers feel more appreciated and
respected. Workers felt that the bonus made it worth
completing their work, despite challenges. Payments were
timely, and some facilities made efforts to increase trans-
parency of incentives by posting what everyone received
on the health facility bulletin.
While the salary top-ups were widely appreciated,
some workers felt that the distribution of funds was un-
fair. They questioned the higher bonuses that techni-
cians and physicians received, even though lower-level
cadres such as nurses and lay counselors exerted greater
effort. Most nurses interviewed argued that since every-
one was working together to maximize payments, they
should all benefit equally. Further, for health workers at
larger facilities, the bonuses were reportedly too small to
dramatically influence behavior or motivation. Accord-
ing to program data, staff bonuses represented 15% to
25% of the monthly salary for higher-level health staff
(e.g., doctors) or for those working in larger facilities
and 30% to 50% of the monthly salary for lower-level
staff (e.g., activists, janitorial technicians) or for rural
staff in small facilities.
Constructive competition and teamwork
Respondents reported that PBF had introduced healthy
competition among colleagues. Health workers were
more conscious of the work completed by colleagues,
which inspired each to work hard to earn their “piece of
the pie.” PBF created this sense of competition by re-
focusing on performance, enhancing transparency, and
increasing accountability.
Management boards were formed as a part of the PBF
program for facility fiscal planning, but often included
only facility administrators (e.g., head nurses and senior
Table 2 Perceived motivational determinants ranking (rank
order) by health workers
Motivational determinants/drivers Average
weighted rank
More organized work environmenta 3.65
Ability to do a good job (perform well) 3.42
Bonus or salary top-up 3.31
Competitive pressureb 3.11
Teamwork 3.10
Satisfaction with personal performance 3.0
Better access to equipment and infrastructure 2.93
Regular consultations with supervisors 2.72
Prestige among the community 2.41
More training opportunities 2.57
Feeling proud as a professionalc 2.0
Not influenced by PBF
Advancement in knowledge to complete work
Meaningfulness/purpose of my work tasks
Trust from patients/clients (politeness/relationships with patients)
Opportunity for professional advancement
a“More organized work environment” and “better access to equipment and
infrastructure” were grouped together due to similarity in description
b“Pressure to perform” and “teamwork” are discussed together due to linkages
in how teamwork dynamics were influenced by pressure or competitiveness
c“Feeling proud as a professional” included “prestige within the community” as
one source of professional pride
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Table 3 Illustrative quotations by motivational domains
Motivational domains Key quotations
Work environment “We had a more organized work environment, because of the [new] chairs, lockers, the fans ... the
environment became more comfortable and safer for my patients.” IDI55_Nampula
“I was not satisfied working in a place that is not clean. [Implementing] PBF brought hygiene supplies and
cleaning. [Now] my work environment is beautiful and well organized. I’m happy with the environment, so
I’m satisfied with my work too, because I work well when I’m in a good place.” IDI34_Nampula
“I will say that the more organized the work environment, the better our activities comply with our
business and management plans and our work environment goals. Because of PBF, we made plans to
ensure our workplace focuses on patient care. We planned what equipment was needed. All this
contributes to a healthy work environment. Before, we did not have a fan to at least reduce the heat in
our office, but now allocating [for equipment] through the PBF means a positive work environment where
the professionals and patients do not feel suffocated from the heat.” IDI25_Gaza
Equipment and infrastructure “It would take 15 years for each facility [to upgrade] if we did not have the PBF [to supply] the porch,
these comfortable chairs, upgraded bathrooms, and electrification. We know a district budget is never
enough to meet all our needs. The PBF therefore has great impact … because it improves working
conditions for health professionals.” IDI35_Nampula
“For example, we have improved chairs; before we were not comfortable. Now I will not tire so easily
[because] I am well seated and can continue with my work without discomfort. Also they have given us
fans [for the heat] and the ventilation helps me spend more time in a small office and meet the patients
without discomfort, [improving] my performance.” IDI18_Gaza
Bonuses “It all depends on the patients that meet (come) to our health facility because the amount is determined
by the data, if the number of patients is greater than we gain more ... the biggest piece of the cake is the
payment that EGPAF provides, so I feel like we have improved because we try to achieve more to earn
more...we make ourselves available of those patients who feel the suffering, and we treat them as our
friends, so that they never want to leave to go to another health facility. If patients left that would be at
the expense of the bonus we receive from EGPAF, and would also not help us achieve our health goals.”
IDI31_Nampula
“Only some providers contribute to the performance that is counted toward the payment. We do not
perform the same jobs [even if] we have the same [level of] performance, only some of that performance
counts to increase the payment. So this is a challenge. Because those who are involved with PBF services
have their performance measured and have to watch over the situation. All of us always tend to work
hard for the bonus because it ends up benefiting the overall performance of the health facility and helps
the others who count to perform better.” IDI31_Nampula
“We are worried; why this difference [in bonuses] if the payment is based on performance? It [should not
be] based on the career or the position that the person has. That is why there were personal contracts
with the PBF ... that each individual had to sign. So the only thing I personally criticize is [the inequity] in
bonuses because it should be the same for everyone.” IDI43_Nampula
“We have so many employees and only cover some of the PBF services so the bonuses are very small for
me. Sometimes I do not notice them as being different from my regular salary.” IDI07_Gaza
Teamwork “I think yes, there was a change, because [now] we always talk about the instruments and indicators and
other PBF matters... [showing] our strong commitment.” IDI04_Gaza
“We say to colleagues that the PBF is for everyone. So all of us have to make every effort together to
achieve those goals or to have those indicators to avail ourselves of [the benefits of] PBF. So there is a
concerted effort to achieve these goals.” IDI21_Gaza
“I think the individual [perspective] ends up being part of a collective. We are earn more as a collective so
we work together to improve. Because first comes motivation, and then when people are motivated
[they] end up doing things to improve the quality of care. And when we improve the quality of care [we]
also improve … the achievement level [of staff in working toward] the objectives of each health sector to
improve indicators.” IDI14_Nampula
Regular consultations with supervisors “Before PBF, if we did not do our job, accountability was not in place, so no one said whether it was done
correctly or done at all.” IDI055_Nampula
“It has been pretty positive to work with the verification team because there is always interaction between
the evaluator and the employee … to show how much we have accomplished, how much we should
have done, and why we did not reach our goals. And then we try to work to overcome what we failed in
before over the next few months.” IDI15_Gaza
“The [new approach to] evaluation is positive because before PBF we worked to produce information to
report to the provincial directors and then to the Ministry. And this information somehow was charged as
we achieved certain goals, and we worked accordingly. But with PBF…we make more effort to reach the
goals we are given because at the end of a certain period we will receive a bonus for that [extra] effort
and it will be acknowledged. With the start of PBF we felt like, efforts were duplicated because in some
ways our efforts were to improve our performance both for government goals and PBF goals- sometimes
the same. Then after some time in PBF, it was really positive because we doubled [our efforts] knowing
we were going to receive something in return.” IDI21_Gaza (Manager)
Application of knowledge and skills to
deliver a good job
“In terms of quality, especially in the provision of services ... we did our duty ... to see the patients and
deliver treatment. But when PBF began it provided an incentive to succeed. The more important outcome
of the incentives is the quality of service provision, so we look at the standards and ask for instructions,
Gergen et al. Human Resources for Health           (2018) 16:55 Page 5 of 10
medical technicians). Workers felt that they were “left
out of important decisions for the facility” because the
management boards were neither participatory nor in-
clusive of their opinions and concerns. In contrast, the
fact that everyone received a bonus meant that all health
workers were more motivated to help each other with
clinical tasks. Most noticed increases in the frequency of
communication with other workers assigned to different
services as well as meetings with the DPS and the imple-
menting NGO’s teams.
Satisfaction with personal performance
Health workers felt that while PBF resulted in a heavier
workload, it also enhanced their drive to complete more
of their tasks, which led to a feeling of job satisfaction.
Respondents agreed that workflow and managerial
organization had improved, which enhanced workers’
ability to finish clinical tasks. Receiving recognition from
verifiers or DPS supervisors led workers to report feeling
greater job satisfaction.
Regular consultations with supervisors
PBF did not directly affect the physical presence of dis-
trict supervisors or use of supportive supervision tech-
niques. However, health workers said that the frequency
and consistency of visits by verification teams were posi-
tive changes. The workers felt constantly monitored but
Table 3 Illustrative quotations by motivational domains (Continued)
Motivational domains Key quotations
and we are committed to doing a good job. This is a significant change, because before we came to do
our duties and then went home. But now my unit is doing a better job and I stay my whole shift time or
even past my shift time make sure each patient is seen and provided care.” IDI51_Nampula
“We applied the knowledge from verifiers. When they come to present to us PBF and how to get more for
our work. PBF taught us some of the things to increases on time with patients. But no, we have not
looked at any new clinical trainings from the DPS (district health manager).” IDI06_Gaza
Competition among my colleagues “We compare our performance among ourselves. We track activities and so does the medical chief. No my
colleagues will show up to say I will do some tests (HIV) because you did your part. This ends up
influencing the indicators and our performance, and we do it together but comparing with each other.
Staff more clearly know what they need to do ... to improve performance, and then together we share the
incentive.” IDI60_Nampula
“We all share a goal now, which will be reached this quarter. If the goal is high, the bonus is also high,
and then it helps a lot to motivate the whole team, or the institution, as well as their own health officials
to seek more, run more, go go go. And we encourage each other when we see one person not doing
their part.” IDI17_Gaza
Feeling satisfied with the work I
complete
“I am satisfied with my work for the moment because I know what work I have to do, and at the end of
the quarter there will be bonuses. I have more motivation because the PBF [has helped] my work to be
fully organized in my office, and my colleagues are also organized for their patients. So PBF really makes
me very satisfied with my own work.” IDI35_Nampula
“We had to achieve the goals, and to achieve those goals and be noticed within the Health Unit, we had
to work hard, we had to follow up with the patients. This drive is satisfying for me in this job.” IDI25_Gaza
“Patients will notice the changes at the facility, the fresh paint and less trash … and are also happy to
have reduced wait times. They tell me we are doing a better job and that is why PBF has improved my
satisfaction.” IDI04_Gaza
Prestige within the community “I think EGPAF wants to improve the indicators as a way to help us as employees, the community, the
hospital, and the Directorate, because they offer a bonus depending on how well we work. That bonus
helps us help the community and the hospital. To us, it means kind, humanized care … encouraging us
to work more for the Health Center to improve infrastructure and everything else. For the community, we
see that the more people are coming and feel comfortable during their wait” IDI36_Nampula
“People were aware that we have to be paid decently for services (provided) because if we do not, we
cannot provide as much service, and patients will abandon us. And if we abandon our indicators in vain,
then we cannot succeed. It is true that it is not right either to come (to the health facility) with a bad
mood, but this is normal happens to everyone, but in terms of performance and delay with the wait time-
we are all now aware, if we do not offer high-quality services ... to our users, they abandon us. What will
happened to us with PBF indicators if we do not provide good service is no increased performance.”
IDI51_Nampula
Feeling proud as a professional “Improving services ... is a way of motivating employees. If the employee feels motivated soon he or she
will ... work with more desire for achieving quality. ... if yesterday had two patient and motivated
professional can make even greater efforts to have MORE patient because it has something that motivates
you ... she has benefit, yes, then it is in this context that I was saying that ... improves the quality of work
and not only ... the very PBF as I was saying ... quality work also with the same value that we have at the
clinic we can buy some equipment that before we did not have the facility, then more so the work
equipment and also improves ... is quality work ... yes.” IDI34_Nampula
“As a health professional, I feel proud … of the work that I do. For example, I can follow a mother from
the ANC visit until delivery, then follow the same mother and child. This leaves me satisfied that I gave a
good follow-up and it was worth it.” IDI24_Gaza
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were happy about the “supportive” nature of the supervi-
sion they received from the verification team.
Interactive effects: PBF feedback loop
Health workers often described how the changes in mo-
tivational drivers to PBF were interactive. External
changes triggered other changes in their intrapersonal
motivational drivers and vice versa. Figure 1 displays this
motivational feedback loop created by PBF’s institutional
and organizational components.
Over two thirds of workers believed PBF had resulted in
a shift in orientation toward clearly defined goals.
Workers were better able to identify the facility’s perform-
ance goals, feel responsible for these goals, and focus their
efforts on “doing their job.” Moreover, sharing the same
goals inspired a feeling of camaraderie throughout the
facility.
Respondents linked clarity of goals with feelings of own-
ership and efficacy, which ultimately resulted in greater
motivation. They credited frequent verification for engen-
dering greater accountability around individual and facility
performance. They also reported feeling more motivated
to achieve shared goals because they could do their jobs
more effectively, given changes in the work environment.
In their view, PBF had improved facility infrastructure,
staff relationships, and workflow.
Achievement
Many health workers described how PBF instilled in them
a new sense of accomplishment and professional pride,
which they viewed as highly motivating. This new sense of
achievement was brought about by introducing and insti-
tutionalizing performance monitoring and managerial
processes, or “regimenting” of the health facility. Respon-
dents viewed this as a crucial driver of performance and of
heightened feelings of motivation and job satisfaction.
Recognition
The achievement of well-defined goals resulted in re-
wards, both financial and non-financial. Good perform-
ance led to increased bonuses for workers, as well as
greater worker investment in the health facility. Most
workers were very happy to receive additional payments
and reported that it boosted morale and allowed them to
take care of their families. These bonuses motivated
them to work harder (longer hours, lower absenteeism)
and communicate more frequently with other clinical
team members. The reward itself garnered recognition
from family and close friends.
Fig. 1 PBF’s feedback loop to enhance health worker motivation. The figure depicts the derived feedback loop between the processes that are
strengthened by PBF
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Beyond the payments, workers also reported feeling rec-
ognized for their work through the PBF program’s meas-
urement and verification of results. Health workers
described how the accountability and governance mecha-
nisms institutionalized in the context of PBF allowed for
more praise and positive reinforcement from verification
teams, management committees, and the community.
Discussion
PBF is a policy reform that aims to directly influence
health worker behavior through several mechanisms,
including changes to institutional arrangements, ac-
countability structures, and financial incentives based
on performance [20, 23–25]. The increasing use of PBF
demands a more in-depth and comprehensive
understanding of how PBF influences health worker
motivation and behavior [25–27]. Research on PBF in-
dicates that some PBF schemes do have the capacity to
enhance overall motivation for providing PBF-targeted
services [18, 28–31]. The effect of PBF on motivation is
usually explained as a stimulus or extrinsic driver of
motivation [32]. The literature documenting PBF’s ef-
fects on health worker motivation, however, suggests
that this conceptualization might be too narrow to ad-
equately capture the complex motivational effects of
PBF [12, 18, 33, 34].
In line with this body of literature, our results show
that health workers perceived both external changes in
the work environment and changes within themselves
that enhanced or hindered feelings of motivation. Health
workers described how the PBF program has signifi-
cantly improved the organization of the facility and the
availability of equipment and supplies required for their
day-to-day job activities, which they found to be motiv-
ating. Results from Nigeria and Benin captured a similar
relationship between health worker motivation and
working conditions [27, 35]. PBF program designers and
implementers should note that the structural changes
and re-investment in the facility can motivate staff and
make it easier for them to do their jobs.
Workers also shared a positive perception of incen-
tives, supported by the sense of accomplishment and sat-
isfaction of earning an additional reward. The aspiration
for additional income or consistent improvement of
health facilities motivated staff to provide patient care
aligned with PBF targets or what they referred to as
goals [32]. In some cases, distribution of incentives cre-
ated feelings of unfairness because certain cadres or
workers with heavier patient loads or administrative du-
ties felt that they should receive a higher proportion of
the bonus compared to facility staff who do not work on
PBF services. Similarly, in larger facilities with many
staff, the incentives were very low and subsequently were
not a significant source of enhanced motivation.
Existing PBF schemes differ considerably in terms of
both the share of PBF payment that is reserved for salary
bonuses (versus investment in the facility) and how the
bonuses are divided between staff. One review of 20 PBF
schemes showed that staff bonuses as a share of total
PBF payments varied between 25 and 80%, and docu-
mented a variety of formulas for distributing payments
among workers within a facility [30]. Given the evidence
that incentives can be a motivational driver in PBF, more
research is required to understand how PBF payment
formulas and allocative disbursements between facility
investment and individuals can drive both motivation
and overall health system strengthening.
The broader health system literature shows that in-
ternal motivational drivers are equally important in
shaping health worker motivation [18]. In Mozambique,
health workers reported changes in improved teamwork
with colleagues, pride and satisfaction associated with
completing their work, and appreciation from verifiers
and colleagues. In other LMICs, internal motives, a
sense of responsibility, pride in one’s work, and recogni-
tion from the community have been shown to be key
motivational drivers [36–38]. From the health worker’s
perspective, the changes contributing to such enhanced
feelings included strengthened management structures,
primarily through the verification process and by facility
administrators checking on service delivery and the
register [39, 40].
Importantly, our findings found that PBF strengthens
an existing feedback loop, exhibited most clearly when
providers described changes to internal and external
drivers together and in a specific cascade. One of the
most common interactive descriptions involved financial
incentives that resulted in other external and internal
shifts in motivation. Financial incentives were perceived
as highly influential and reportedly increased health
workers’ motivation to exert additional effort to meet in-
creased demand, feel pride in one’s work, and communi-
cate with one another about service delivery. Further,
when questioned about how PBF creates and sustains
changes in perceived motivation, a feedback loop involv-
ing responsibility, achievement, and recognition. The in-
stitutional and organizational arrangements that PBF
changed helped facilitate this cycle or feedback loop and
helped workers feel that they had well-defined, achiev-
able goals to work toward, while accountability and gov-
ernance meant that many health workers received praise
from verification teams, management committees, and
colleagues.
Although this interactive relationship has not been
made explicit in PBF publications, feedback loops are an
integral component of all systems and evidence of this
feedback loop is supported by evidence. For instance, in
Zambia, PBF enhanced job satisfaction through better
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working conditions and more effective supervision, in
addition to higher job satisfaction with compensation,
feelings of accomplishment, and financial autonomy
[12]. In Malawi, health workers were motivated by the
goals and direction introduced by PBF [18]. A more en-
abling working environment induced by PBF (e.g., im-
proved resource situation, enhanced supervision, better
management support) (1) allowed health workers to im-
prove their performance by aiming for these goals, (2)
created new feelings of self-efficacy and pride as health
workers recognized their accomplishments, and (3) were
positively reinforced by managers, the community, and
implementers, verbally and through PBF rewards. This
fueled a positive spiral of motivation to continuously im-
prove performance [18].
Limitations
The methodology adopted in this study—capturing in-
formation on the effects of PBF health systems through
semi-structured interviews with health workers—has
several limitations. First, respondents were selected in
collaboration with facility management, which could
have led to a biased sample of motivated or positive
health workers. Although the evaluation was conducted
by a third-party evaluator, project implementers and
occasionally DPS accompanied our data collectors to
the facility to facilitate the introduction and coordin-
ation of the interviews; their presence could have influ-
enced the views expressed by study participants. The
interview guide was open-ended, but all health workers
were probed on personal motivational changes attrib-
uted to PBF. The motivational determinants were de-
fined through free-list exercises with health workers
not included in the study but working in the same
provinces as comparable health facilities prior to the
data collection period. The probing may have intro-
duced concepts that the workers would not have men-
tioned or noted on their own.
Conclusion
Our study found that PBF led to changes in both in-
ternal and external drivers of health worker motivation
and created an interactive feedback loop involving re-
sponsibility, achievement, and recognition. The institu-
tional and organization arrangements that PBF created
allowed for workers to feel that they had well-defined
goals and could achieve these targets, and accountabil-
ity and governance allowed for many health workers to
receive praise from verification teams, management
committees, and colleagues.
Our paper shows that financial incentives can serve
as the “driver” to kick-start the loop in environments
that lack other drivers. For countries thinking about
PBF, we recommend that policymakers assess the loop
in their contexts, identify drivers, determine whether
these drivers are sufficient, and consider PBF if they
are not.
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